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Beyond the Paradox: Religion, Family and

Modernity in Contemporary Bangladesh







This paper reﬂects on the apparent ‘paradox’ of a contemporary Bangladesh 
that appears both ‘more modern’ and ‘more Islamic’, focusing on changes in the 
family (and the gender and generational orders that it embodies) as a central 
locus of anxiety and contestation. The paper begins with theory, how the paradox 
is framed by classical social science expectations of religious decline and how this 
has been contested by contemporary writers who describe speciﬁcally modern 
forms of piety. It then turns to Bangladesh, where highly publicized symbolic 
oppositions between ‘religion’ and ‘development’ contrast sharply with people’s 
pragmatic accommodation of development goods in everyday life. Analysis of 
religious references in interview data reveal the co-existence of very different 
understandings: a more traditional view of religion as embedded in the moral 
order; and a more modern deliberate cultivation of a religious life. They also 
reveal how many of the uses which people make of religion are not speciﬁcally 
religious: to conjure a moral universe, to mark what is important to them, to 
say things about themselves. The ﬁnal section returns to theory, reﬂecting on 
how this is informed by the ﬁndings from Bangladesh, and suggesting that the 
importance of the private and personal as a site for governance offers a further 
dimension of why the supposed ‘paradox’ of a religious modernity may not be so 
paradoxical after all. 
Introduction 
The family itself is a religion for us. 
(shongshartaei to amader ekta dharma)1 
For most of its history Bangladesh has been a by-word for poverty 
and underdevelopment. Recently, however, this has changed. The 
1 Jahanara Begum—40a Mm (see footnote  12 for key to codes regarding quotations 
from interviews). 
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‘litany of grim statistics’2 of Bangladesh’s twentieth-century proﬁle 
is giving way to a cautious heralding as development success. In 
2006–2007 annual growth in GDP was recorded as 6.5 per cent.3 
Dhaka is transformed from a sleepy backwater in the mid 1980s 
to a megalopolis of some 7 million people,4 with the characteristic 
extremes of slums and shopping malls, trafﬁc jams and pollution, dust-
ﬁlled factories and high rise universities. New roads, electriﬁcation and 
mobile telephones connect once remote villages into the nation state 
and global market. Brick kilns are everywhere, producing the hard-
core on which construction depends in a country built on Himalayan 
silt. The contradictions of economic growth, won through the ruthless 
exploitation of people and natural environment, are mirrored in the 
political sphere. Soldiers and armed police mark the fragility of a 
democratic settlement that has never seen the military far from the 
centre of power. 
In classical social science such transformations in economy and 
society are expected to accompany the decline of religion. In fact, 
however, the predominantly Muslim identity which has been used 
since colonial times to score the territorial boundaries of what is now 
Bangladesh is receiving new emphasis. Substantial Hindu migration 
to India since Partition in 1947 means Muslims now make up 
almost 90 per cent of the population.5 Although the Constitution 
of Bangladesh newly independent in 1971 asserted the separation 
of religion and politics, within a few years Islam re-emerged as 
part of the political lexicon. Globalization and most immediately 
the growth of labour migration to the Arabian Gulf has brought 
new money and new cultural inﬂuences in its wake. City and village 
landscapes are peppered with more, and more elaborate mosques; 
ofﬁcial schedules give way to accommodate prayer and fasting; more 
people are adopting more comprehensive forms of Islamic dress. 
From an overwhelming stress on the economy, therefore, there is 
a new register amongst commentators on Bangladesh: a focus on 
religion, and especially its more fundamentalist forms, addressed 
2 Arthur, W. and McNicholl, G. 1978. ‘An analytical survey of population and 
development in Bangladesh’. Population and Development Review 4 (1):23–80. 
3 Bangladesh at a Glance. Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS) 2007. 
http://www.bbs.gov.bd/Home.aspx (accessed 27 December 2011). 
4 Ibid. 
5 The 2001 Bangladesh Census ﬁgures are Muslim 89.6 per cent; Hindu 9.4 per 
cent; Christian 0.3 per cent; Buddhist 0.6 per cent; Others 0.15 per cent. In the 1981 
Census, Muslims were 86.7 per cent, Hindus 12.1 per cent. 
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primarily as an issue of politics.6 This contrasts sharply with more 
established views on Islam in Bengal, which emphasize its syncretism 
and malleability, its grounding in Suﬁ thought and long co-residence 
with Hindu neighbours giving many different and localized traditions 
of practice and belief.7 
This paper interrogates the sense of paradox evoked by a 
contemporary Bangladesh characterized as at once ‘more modern’ 
and ‘more Islamic’. In place of public politics, however, it relates 
this to discussion of the family and everyday living. The focus on 
family is not random, but reﬂects its centrality to the social order, 
and thus to people’s expressed anxieties about social change. Family 
in Bangladesh is the core institution for the delivery of welfare and 
social control; for the performance of gender and age-based roles and 
responsibilities; and stands as a microcosm for the wellbeing of society 
as a whole. As such it plays a central part in the construction of the 
moral order, which is also commonly expressed in religious terms.8 
This ties religion and the family closely together: since both ground 
and symbolize the moral order, changes in either will have implications 
for the other. As argued below, these relations are also emphasized 
and re-cast by the contradictory dynamics of modernity, which are 
re-structuring both family and religion in contemporary Bangladesh. 
6 Seabrook, J. (2002). Freedom Unﬁnished: Fundamentalism and Popular Resistance in 
Bangladesh Today. Zed Books; Riaz, Ai. (2008). Islamist Militancy in Bangladesh. A Complex 
Web. London: Routledge; Datta, S. (2008). ‘Islamic Militancy in Bangladesh: The 
Threat from Within’, South Asia: Journal of South Asia, 30 (1), pp. 145–170; Karlekar, 
H. (2005). Bangladesh: The Next Afghanistan? Sage. 
7 Ahmed, R. (1981). The Bengal Muslims, 1871–1906: A Quest of Identify. Delhi: 
OUP; Maloney, C., Aziz, A. and Sarkar, P. C. (1981). Beliefs and Fertility in Bangladesh. 
Bangladesh: International Centre for Diarrhoeal Disease Research (ICDDR,B); 
Abecassis, D. (1990). Identity, Islam and Human Development in Rural Bangladesh. Dhaka: 
University Press Limited; Banu, UAB, R. A. (1992). Islam in Bangladesh. Leiden: E. J. 
Brill; Uddin, S. M. 2006. Constructing Bangladesh: Religion, Ethnicity, and Language in an 
Islamic Nation. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 
8 The closeness of these ties are underlined by the fact that ‘dharma’, the  term  
derived from Sanskrit which is commonly translated as ‘religion’ in Bangladesh 
and northern India, is also used to describe the cultural grounding of this moral 
order, providing a foundational logic which structures the family along with all 
social institutions, including, but not limited to, those identiﬁed more particularly 
as ‘religious’. For more detailed discussion see a companion paper, ‘Religion, politics 
and the moral order in Bangladesh’, J. Devine and S. C. White, (2009) Religions 
and Development Working Paper 40, University of Birmingham. Discussion with Joe 
Devine has been of great signiﬁcance in preparing this paper, and special thanks are 
due to him as a supportive and stimulating colleague. 
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The paper begins with theory. This has two aspects. First, how 
the ‘paradox’ is framed by the historical experience of Europe and 
how it has been critiqued by some contemporary scholars of Islamic 
societies. Second, how changes in the structure and ideology of family 
offer parallels to the shifts observed in religion and how these have a 
common basis in modernist constructions of ‘public’ versus ‘private’ 
spheres. The paper then turns to Bangladesh, where highly publicized 
symbolic oppositions between ‘religion’ and ‘development’ contrast 
sharply with people’s pragmatic incorporation of development goods 
in everyday life. Analysis of religious references in interviews reveal 
the co-existence of very different understandings: a more traditional 
view of religion as embedded in the moral order; and a more modern 
deliberate cultivation of a religious life. They also problematize the 
emphasis of recent commentators on fundamentalist forms of belief, 
as they reveal the many different ways that people use religious 
references: to conjure a moral universe, to mark what is important 
to them, to say things about themselves. The ﬁnal section returns 
to theory, reﬂecting on how this is informed by the ﬁndings from 
Bangladesh, and suggesting that the importance of the private and 
personal as a site for governance offers a further dimension of why the 
supposed ‘paradox’ of a religious modernity may not be so paradoxical 
after all. 
Before proceeding, an important caveat should be noted. There 
is a danger that in concentrating primarily on Muslims, this paper 
reinforces the current characterization of Bangladesh as a ‘Muslim 
nation’. To balance this, it is important to stress that there continues 
to be religious diversity in Bangladesh. Moves to ‘purify’ Islamic 
observance notwithstanding, there is still considerable crossover 
between religious traditions in practice, especially when seeking 
healing. However, there is no doubt that inter-religious relations are 
becoming more communalized: while it was common for Muslims to 
attend Hindu religious celebrations a generation ago, this is now more 
rarely observed. 
The research on which this paper draws took place in two villages, 
one in Dinajpur district, north-west Bangladesh and one in Manikganj 
district, near Dhaka, central Bangladesh. An initial study in 2006 
was followed by further research in Dinajpur in 2008.9 For the most 
9 The logic behind this selection of villages was to capture a contrast in distance 
from the hub of development/modernity in Bangladesh, the capital city, Dhaka. This 
was relevant to the larger study within which the data presented in this paper were 
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part, the interviews did not ask speciﬁcally about religion, but rather 
sought to explore more broadly changing patterns in the construction 
of marriage, family and identity.10 In most cases the paper thus draws 
on religious references which arose naturally during conversation, 
rather than in response to a speciﬁc prompt. The interviews involved 
70 respondents comprising a cross-section of Muslims and Hindus 
of different wealth categories and a small group of non-Bengali 
‘Adivasis’.11 A classiﬁcation code has been assigned to each individual, 
identifying them in basic terms by sex, religion, and a very basic 
economic distinction—‘rich’, ‘middle’, poor.12 
Dismantling the paradox 
The sense of paradox that surrounds states like Bangladesh being 
characterized at once by advancing globalized capitalism and the 
increased visibility of Islam derives from the European path to 
modernity. The ﬁrst aspect of this is secularization. From the 
gathered, but no clear patterns by site could be identiﬁed in the much more limited 
sample and focus of attention here. 
10 The 2006 research was conducted under the ESRC Research Group Wellbeing 
in Developing Countries (WeD), University of Bath, 2002–2007. The support of the 
ESRC is gratefully acknowledged. The 2008 study and analysis of this data has been 
carried out under the Research Programme Consortium in Religion and Development 
led by the University of Birmingham, 2005–2010, funded by the UK Department 
for International Development (DFID) for the beneﬁt of developing countries. The 
views expressed are not necessarily those of DFID. The interviews were conducted by 
members of the WeD Bangladesh team, following proﬁles which I designed. Particular 
thanks are due to M. Hasan Ashraf, Nasrin Sultana, Suborna Camelia, Taifur Rahman, 
and Tahmina Ahmed. 
11 The 2006 research involved 58 respondents from couples in which husband 
and wife were interviewed separately and 10 single elderly life histories. From the 
2008 research this paper draws on one individual case history; eight focus groups 
and one extended case study focused on religion and family life. All the interviewees 
were drawn from the wider WeD sample and thus had already completed a general 
household questionnaire. 
12 The case studies are coded as follows. The number after the initials of the name 
shows the district and couple number. The small letter shows sex—a for female, b 
for male. The next capital letter shows religion, ‘M’ for Muslim or ‘H’ for Hindu. The 
ﬁnal letter provides a very rough economic categorization: ‘r’ for rich, ‘m’ for middle, 
‘p’ for poor, based on a mix of occupational and asset status, and self-classiﬁcation. 
The case study respondent proﬁle is as follows: Manikganj total 33: 7 Hindu, 26 
Muslim; 7 rich, 11 middle, 15 poor; Dinajpur: total 35: 4 Hindu, 29 Muslim, 2 Santal 
(Adivasi); 4 rich, 22 middle, 9 poor. Focus groups were organized separately by age 
and gender. The sample was chosen to cover a range of criteria, and not intended to 
be representative of the villages as a whole, either by wealth or religion. 
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Enlightenment onwards into the drive towards industrialization came 
a massive increase in the complexity of the division of labour, 
establishing, for example, separate professions, academic disciplines, 
and institutions of law, market and state. Religious institutions 
similarly became more specialized, and more removed from the 
centres of power to their own separate—and more peripheral— 
sphere. Whilst some countries have established the state as strictly 
secular, in many there remains some role for religious actors and 
institutions in ofﬁcial space. Even there, however, the sphere of 
inﬂuence has been re-deﬁned. Religion has become a ‘matter of 
conscience’, concerned with issues of values and beliefs, something 
associated predominantly with the personal rather than public sphere. 
Early theorists of modernity thus famously expected that religion 
would disappear altogether, part of the ‘childhood of humankind’, 
of an ‘enchanted’ worldview overtaken by an evolutionary process 
of scientiﬁc progress and bureaucratic rationalization. Against such 
expectations, the current prominence of religion particularly in some 
forms of nationalist politics appears paradoxical: a riddle which some 
scholars suggest is solved by the moral emptiness of modernity, which 
people turn to religion to ﬁll.13 
The second aspect of the framing of this ‘paradox’ relates to Islam 
in particular and the way it has been rendered as the ‘other’ of 
modernity. Evident in gross forms such as Huntington’s ‘clash of 
civilizations’ theory,14 this process of ‘othering’ is an essential part 
of the constitution of the modern. Grossberg puts it like this: 
The modern constitutes its own identity by differentiating itself from an­
other (usually tradition as a temporal other or spatial others transformed 
into temporal others).15 
As Said has shown in Orientalism,16 Islam and Islamic societies offer 
a paradigmatic case of this ‘other’, being associated with the exotic, 
erotic, quixotic and barbaric. This has cast a long shadow, particularly 
13 Thomas, S. M. (2004). The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of 
International Politics. New York: Palgrave/Macmillan. 
14 Huntington, S. P. (1993). ‘The Clash of Civilizations?’, Foreign Affairs 72 (3): 
22–49, Summer. 
15 Grossberg, L. (1996) ‘Identity and cultural studies: is that all there is?’ In Stuart 
Hall and Paul du Gay (eds), Questions of Cultural Identity. London: Sage, pp. 87–107, 
especially p. 93. 
16 Said, E. (1985). Orientalism. Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
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for those forms of Islam that are seen as politically hostile to the West. 
Thus Lara Deeb argues: 
Despite a plethora of literature about Islamism and modern(ities), less has 
been written about how Islamists and pious Muslims themselves grapple 
with what it means to be modern, without assuming the nature of the 
links between modern-ness and the West. Instead, much of this work has 
held Islamism to be either a cultural resistance to a Western modernity, 
or only selectively modern. Both these perspectives generally work from 
that historicist understanding of modernity as based in the West, with 
Islamists either written outside that universalizing project or allowed within 
its technological, but not its cultural, spaces.17 
Reacting to similar issues Mahmood argues that Islamism and 
liberal secularity are closely interwoven, through ‘historically shifting, 
ambiguous, and unpredictable encounters’.18 Deeb slices through the 
supposed oppositions as she describes ‘an enchanted modern’ amongst 
the Islamists she studied in Shi’a Lebanon. She proposes: 
rather than view Islamists as necessarily engaged in a struggle with 
modernity, we can instead view spiritual progress as a potential aspect of 
the modern.19 
A ﬁnal thread that unravels the ‘paradox’ is drawn from within the 
European experience itself. The secularization that shifted religious 
institutions in Europe from centre stage was associated not simply with 
a move from one category to another, but rather with the constitution 
of public/private difference as a key organizing principle of modern 
society.20 Critical to this construction of the ‘private sphere’, of course, 
is its identiﬁcation with the family. While this positioning of the family 
has become so foundational that it appears ‘natural’, it is important to 
remember that it is anything but. As any anthropological textbook will 
show, in pre-modern society family—or ‘kinship’—typically provides 
the accepted basis for wide-reaching structures of social, economic 
and political organization. Feminist scholarship has also pointed out 
17 Deeb, L. (2006). An Enchanted Modern: Gender and Public Piety in Shi’a Lebanon. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 15. 
18 Mahmood, Saba. (2005). The Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist 
Subject. Princeton University Press, p. 25. 
19 Deeb, An Enchanted Modern, p.  18. 
20 Engels, Frederich. (2004), (1884). The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the 
State. Australia: Resistance Books. 
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the important articulations between public ‘production’ and private 
‘reproduction’.21 
With the constitution of the private sphere come new narratives 
of the person, which offer new discursive resources with respect 
to religion and family and to the way relations between them are 
conceived. For the family, changes in the material structures of 
living together are accompanied by shifts in ideologies of love and 
care. Evidence from around the world suggests (more individualist) 
discourses of love, passion, choice and romance are increasingly 
challenging earlier narratives of (social or collective) duty, obligation 
and honour.22 Discourses of individual responsibility and choice 
similarly re-calibrate the orientation of religion from the collective and 
taken for granted to a matter of reﬂective cultivation; from inherited 
afﬁliation to chosen identity and personal conviction. 
If the public sphere is the realm of power, being located in 
the private might mean exclusion from political inﬂuence on the 
one hand, or liberation from political control on the other. Such 
arguments have been applied to both religion and the family. Two 
considerations, however, suggest that this needs reconsidering. In 
the ﬁrst place, the politics of identity have brought supposedly 
‘private’ attributes (such as gender or sexuality) into the grammar 
of public claims-making.23 Secondly, following Foucault’s History of 
Sexuality (1981) the private sphere has been analysed not as an 
arena of personal freedom, but rather as itself a site for the ever 
more invasive extension of power and governance. Modernity, in this 
reading, has not brought sexual liberation, but rather constructed 
sexuality as a site of power, in which a ‘polymorphous incitement 
to discourse’ requires individuals to construct ever more detailed 
21 Edholm, F., Harris, O. and Young, K. (1977). ‘Conceptualizing women’, Critique 
of Anthropology 3 (9/10):101–130. 
22 Mahmood (2005), The Politics of Piety. See also e.g. on Bedouin people in Egypt, 
Abu Lughod, Lila. 1990. ‘The romance of resistance: tracing transformations of power 
through Bedouin women’. American Ethnologist 17(1):41–55; on Korea, Kendall, L. 
(1996). Getting Married in Korea. Of Gender, Morality and Modernity. Berkeley/London: 
University of California Press; on Andalucia, Spain, Collier, J. F. (1997). From Duty 
to Desire: Remaking families in a Spanish village. Princeton: Princeton University Press; 
on Lebanon, Joseph, S. (ed.) (1999). Intimate Selving in Arab Families: Gender, Self and 
Identity. Syracuse University Press; on Nepal, Ahearn, Laura M. 2001. Invitations to 
Love: Literacy, Love Letters, and Social Change in Nepal. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press; and on Kerala, Osella, F. and Osella, C. (2008). ‘Islamism and social reform in 
Kerala, South India’. Modern Asian Studies. 42(2–3): 259–281, March.  
23 See for example, Fraser, N. (1997) Justice Interruptus. Critical Reﬂections on the 
‘Post-Socialist’ Condition. London: Routledge. 
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narratives of the self. Nikolas Rose pursues this line further as he 
seeks to explore power not as commonly imagined a constraint on 
subjectivity, but rather how it constitutes subjectivity and individuals 
‘free to choose’.24 Individuals are encouraged to take responsibility for 
their own wellbeing, seeking for their personal fulﬁlment the goals or 
activities that are institutionally or socially valued.25 For Rose, as a 
result, ‘life has become a skilled performance’26 in which the promise 
of perfectibility through technical control comes at the cost that ‘the 
self becomes the target of a reﬂexive objectifying gaze’—with each 
person one’s own sternest critic.27 Although secular in tone, this phrase 
has strong resonance with Saba Mahmood’s description of the goal of 
the Islamist mosque movement in Egypt as the cultivation of the ‘pious 
self’.28 A word of caution is in order here. To point out similarity is not 
to imply identity. The religious idiom of submission is very different to 
that of technical control. Also there are many forms in which modern 
selves may appear, bearing the marks of the cultural resources on 
which they draw as well as the social and political context in which 
they emerge.29 Drawing attention to the ‘politics of the personal’ in 
this way, however, clearly suggests that the articulation of religion 
in the public sphere may not be so surprising as some commentators 
would lead us to believe. 
Symbolic oppositions 
The persistence in Bangladesh of mass poverty, continued reliance on 
low capitalized physical labour, endemic corruption in public service 
and market practice, recurrent military involvement in politics and the 
fragility of the rule of law, clearly make it very far from the textbook 
account of a modern society characterized by a faith in progress; 
industrial production and a market economy; and political institutions 
24 Rose, N. (1989). Governing the Soul. The Shaping of the Private Self. London:  
Routledge. 
25 Ibid, p. 208. 
26 Ibid, p. 238. 
27 Ibid, p. 239. 
28 This resonance is not coincidental, of course: Mahmood draws heavily on 
Foucauldian analysis in presenting her study. 
29 Haniffa, F. (2008). ‘Piety as politics amongst Muslim women in contemporary 
Sri Lanka’. Modern Asian Studies 42(2–3): 347–375, March.  
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regulated through bureaucratic rationality and democratic politics.30 
What it does however exemplify is modernity in post-colonial mode. 
As Stuart Hall describes: 
. . .the transition to ‘post-colonial’ is characterised by independence from 
direct colonial rule, the formation of new nation states, forms of economic 
development dominated by the growth of indigenous capital and their 
relations of neo-colonial dependency on the developed capitalist world, and 
the politics which arise from emergence of powerful local elites managing 
the contradictory effects of under-development. Just as signiﬁcant, it is 
characterised by the persistence of many of the effects of colonisation, but at 
the same time their displacement from the coloniser/colonised axis to their 
internalisation within the decolonised society itself.31 
The need for a unifying ideology to manage the contradictions 
of post-colonial modernity is without doubt part of the reason that 
successive governments in Bangladesh have turned to religion to 
bolster their legitimacy. But ‘religion’ can also serve as an idiom 
through which struggles to deﬁne the social order are expressed. 
In Bangladesh the 1990s thus saw a series of major public 
symbolic conﬂicts, in the shape of ‘fundamentalist’ attacks on Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and fatwas, mostly against 
‘immorality’, especially of poor women, and some against the gender 
work of NGOs.32 Both sides extracted maximum value from these 
events, posing them as confrontations between on the one hand 
obscurantist religion and ‘the mullahs’ against the NGOs as women’s 
advocates and harbingers of modernity; and on the other hand religion 
as upholder of morality and authenticity, against the NGOs as agents 
of imperialism.33 As many commentators have said, these symbolic 
30 Giddens, A. (1998). Conversations with Anthony Giddens: Making Sense of Modernity. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
31 Hall, Stuart. 1996. ‘When was the “post-colonial”? Thinking at the Limit’. pp. 
242–260, in Chambers, Iain and Curti, Lidia (eds) The Post-Colonial Question: Common 
Skies, Divided Horizons. London: Routledge. 
32 Between January 1993 and December 1996 more than 60 fatwas were recorded 
in Bangladesh as reported by Ain O Salish Kendro in Shehabuddin, Elora (1999). 
‘Contesting the Illicit: Gender and the Politics of Fatwas in Bangladesh’. Signs, Vol. 
24, No.  4, Institutions, Regulation, and Social Control (Summer), pp. 1011–1044. In  
a great victory for feminist organization, the highest court in Bangladesh declared all 
fatwas illegal in 2000, see Karim, Lamia. (2004). ‘Democratizing Bangladesh: State, 
NGOs, and Militant Islam’. Cultural Dynamics 16 (2/3):291–31, p.  303. 
33 Naher, A. (2005). Gender, Religion and Development in Rural Bangladesh. University of 
Heidelberg: unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. For further discussion see Shehabuddin, 
Elora. (2008). Reshaping the Holy. Democracy, Development and Muslim Women in Bangladesh. 
New York: Columbia University Press. 
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clashes also served as a means of settling much more local and personal 
scores. 
High proﬁle events hotly debated in the national press were only the 
most prominent examples of a whole series of more minor disputes 
that ricocheted across the country. Ainoon Naher states that in the 
area she studied34 ‘one of the most signiﬁcant accusations’ against the 
NGOs was that they were seeking to break up the traditional family 
order through targeting women in their development programmes, 
dominant amongst which is the supply of microcredit.35 Thus in a 
large annual religious meeting (waz) it was claimed that the Grameen 
Bank, a major provider of loans to village women in Bangladesh, taught 
women to chant: 
Shami boro na sir36 boro? Is husband greater, or ‘sir’ greater? 
Sir boro, sir boro. ‘Sir’ is greater, ‘Sir’ is greater.37 
This same allegation, extended to NGOs in general, was reported 
by a focus group of elderly men in our research. While there is little 
doubt that its substance is false, it is interesting to muse on its 
structure. The alleged chant does not run: ‘Who is greater, husband or 
wife?’ The perceived issue is not therefore the empowerment of women, 
but the replacement of domestic patriarchy by development patriarchy— 
or the local by the global; or the (Islamic) universal by the (Western? 
modern? secular?) particular, depending on one’s point of view. A 
second chant reported by Naher reinforces this: 
Shamir kotha shunbo na We won’t listen to our husbands 
Grameen Bank charbo na We won’t leave the Grameen Bank38 
In our research, the second chant reported took a rather different 
line, widening the sense of a shift in the moral order: 
Shami boro na taka boro? Is husband greater, or money greater? 
This links into a broader set of associations over the increased 
centrality of money and its challenge to the moral order which were 
a recurrent theme in group discussions, especially amongst older 
men. These include a rise in demand for consumer consumption, 
34 ‘Jiri’, in Chittagong district, South East Bangladesh, 1996–1998, with short 
follow-up visits in 1999 and 2001. 
35 Naher, Gender, Religion and Development p. 151. 
36 ‘Sir’ refers to a Grameen Bank worker. 
37 Naher, Gender, Religion and Development, p.  152, my translation. 
38 Ibid. 
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the paradigmatic case of which takes a feminized form—saris and 
cosmetics. The responsibility of husbands and fathers to provide for 
their families is seen to be strained by increasing expectations of 
both quantity and quality from wives and children, who a generation 
ago would have been happy with whatever he brought home. They 
also include competition between husband and wife over control over 
money and marital tension and conﬂict when loans have to be repaid. 
There is also a class aspect to this. Since it is mainly poorer people who 
rely on NGO loans, there is a paternalistic concern that they will be 
led into debt and ultimately left even poorer than before. The moral 
ambiguity of the NGOs which present the most evident material form 
of the alien forces which underlie such changes is encapsulated in the 
following description: 
NGOs never listen to any defaulter. They will take tin off the roof or seize a 
cow if the client fails to pay. They know only money. This is nothing but an 
interest business [elderly male focus group]. 
In a rural Muslim context, terming NGOs ‘interest businesses’ 
places them triply outside the moral community: ﬁrst for taking 
interest which is seen as haram, unclean by Islamic law; second for 
being a business when they make claims to being a humanitarian or 
social welfare organization; and third for conducting a relationship on 
de-personalized terms, under which a loan must be repaid whatever 
hardship this causes to the borrower, so violating any notion of a moral 
economy. 
Such highly moralized terms are not, however, the only way that 
NGOs and their loans appear in local narratives. In marked contrast 
to the focus group discussions, the individual interviews depict NGO 
credit in much more pragmatic terms, as providing one option amongst 
the many that people mobilize to make ends meet in difﬁcult times. 
Here, instead of undermining ‘the family’, loans appear instead as an 
important means which families use to get by. People therefore talked 
of taking NGO loans to help them run the family; to pay a bribe to 
get a son a job; to pay dowries; to pay for a house; being wasted by a 
husband; being shared with sons; enabling a widow to support herself; 
and to buy clothes for Eid. What is striking in these accounts is how 
very much within the everyday are the options the NGOs provide and 
how seamless is the articulation between the ‘moral community’ of 
personalized lending amongst family and neighbours and the loans 
taken from NGOs, such that one is frequently used alongside or to 
repay the other. 
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An intriguing footnote to this high proﬁle confrontation between 
‘religion’ and ‘development’ is the way that some changes have not 
attracted a speciﬁcally religious condemnation. The employment 
of women in garment factories has arguably constituted a more 
fundamental challenge to purdah39 norms and the gender division 
of labour than has NGO-based credit which is frequently passed 
on to household men.40 There is certainly a lot of grumbling about 
the garments factories, and women who work there face criticism 
on grounds of morality. But they have not attracted the fatwas and 
religion-identiﬁed attacks that the NGOs have. This conﬁrms that 
the substance of the NGO-‘Mullah’ confrontation lay indeed in the 
symbolic, or political, capital that each side could derive from it, rather 
than this signifying any more structural antagonism between ‘Islam’ 
and the expansion of women’s economic activity. 
Family and the moral order 
A sense of moral order and one’s relationship to it pervades all of the 
interviews, across gender, class, age, ethnic and religious differences. 
Views differ on how far ‘what is’ tallies with ‘what should be’ and 
the details of how it should work in practice, but at the heart is the 
notion of right relationships and of the importance of being in the 
right place. In expressing this sense of order people at times make an 
explicit religious reference, and at other times do not. In contrast to 
the modernist identiﬁcation of religion with a distinct area of life, for 
most of our respondents this sense of order is simply part of what is 
taken for granted, the everyday, not something privatized or set apart. 
In classic Weberian terms, this is an ‘enchanted’ worldview. Geography 
is marked by sacred or dangerous places, the graveyard that must 
be walked around or the forest where spirits live. Most famous, of 
course, are the notions of ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ that govern women’s 
mobility and scope for activity in the purdah idiom shared—though 
with some differences in practice—between Muslim and Hindu. Time 
39 ‘Purdah’, literally ‘curtain’, refers to the norm of female seclusion. This cultural 
orientation is common to both Hindus and Muslims in northern India, Bangladesh 
and Pakistan, though norms for its practice have always varied. See e.g., Papanek, 
H. and Minault, G. (eds) Separate Worlds: Studies of Purdah in South Asia. Columbia, 
Missouri: South Asia Books’. 
40 Goetz, A. M. and Sen Gupta, R. (1996). ‘Who takes the credit? Gender, power 
and loan use in rural Bangladesh’ World Development 24:1: 45–83. 
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too—the rhythm of days, of the seasons, of the years, and the cycle 
of an individual life—is elaborated in sacred as well as in practical 
ways. The moral order is seen to be written in nature, society and 
religion. Thus to get married is at once a good thing, a fulﬁlment of 
nature, a social responsibility and a religious duty. To get children 
married well is a primary responsibility of parental guardianship and 
the focus of major personal and cultural anxiety. The arrangement 
and celebration of marriage is a collective enterprise, in which Allah 
or the gods are honoured and bonds of kinship and community are 
animated and extended, well beyond the individual couple involved.41 
In ideal terms at least, conformity with the moral order extends 
even to the level of emotions. At a discursive level, if not necessarily at 
the level of actual experience, ‘what is’ thus elides with ‘what should 
be’. Statements like the following are common: 
Parents love all their children equally. 
This is the command of God as well.42 
The love of a husband for a wife is unique, as is women’s love for their 
husbands. All women feel tenderness for their husbands. This has come from 
God, it cannot be questioned.43 
Where things do not just come naturally, however, religion may be 
brought in with society to ensure proper behaviour: 
It is also in religion that a girl has to obey her husband as the guardian. . .. 
All sacriﬁces have to be made for the husband. The girl whose husband is 
not happy with her will not get people’s appreciation nor anything in the life 
after death.44 
Amidst this view of the moral order as given and beyond question, 
there is also the sense of something very different going on. As 
elsewhere in the world, Bangladesh is experiencing considerable 
challenge by gender and generation, in both material arrangements 
and social norms of authority, respect, deference, or proper behaviour 
between older and younger, men and women. The cultural norm of a 
joint family household, in which married sons and their families live 
together in their father’s house, is being gradually eroded, as more 
41 A fuller discussion of how marriage and family relations are changing in 
Bangladesh and its implication for gender and generational relations will be presented 
in a companion paper drawn from the same research project (forthcoming). 
42 Osman Ali—7b Mm.  
43 Latefa—08a Mr.  
44 Osman Ali—17b Mm.  
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separate (‘nuclear’) households become the norm. In the larger study 
of 1500 households of which this research forms a part, 62.5 per cent 
were nuclear in structure. This continues a long term trend: village-
level research undertaken in the 1960s and  1970s already reports 
at least half the households being nuclear in structure.45 Narratives 
here concern a growing emphasis on the marital relationship; the 
increasing involvement of young people themselves in choosing their 
own marriage partners; and material anxieties about care and support 
in old age. These raise a more general anxiety that the moral order 
may be breaking down: the rise of action motivated by personal desire 
rather than by conformity with social rules; an increase of ‘greed’ or 
selﬁshness; and claims of rising inter-personal conﬂict. The aspect 
of ‘moral panic’ attending these issues may exaggerate the extent 
of change: the ﬁgure of ‘love marriage’, for example, appears as a 
kind of folk devil standing for disorder incarnate, but such marriages 
are actually relatively rare in our data. This notwithstanding, it is 
clear that marriages are taking place later than they were, and social 
acceptance seems to have now shifted to accepting that young people 
meet before marriage, rather than the previous model of sight unseen. 
There is difference in the detail of what people consider the form of 
‘right relationships’—whether the roles of husbands and wives should 
be more or less differentiated; or the signiﬁcance of romantic love 
in marriage. Such changes at the household level reﬂect a whole 
range of factors: new technologies, greater integration into market 
and state, migration and urbanization, more education, a rapid decline 
in fertility, and increased diversity of employment, including a marked 
expansion of opportunities for economic activity for women. 
Discourses of the moral order thus identify it in apparently 
contradictory ways: as given and inalienable, under profound threat, or 
open to accommodation in the way it is realized on a day-to-day basis 
and what is appropriate in ‘modern times’. References to religious 
authority provide one resource which people draw on in establishing 
these positions, and the ways these references are made themselves 
suggest more ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ ways in which religion is being 
construed. 
45 Bertocci, P. 1970. Elusive Villages: Social Structure and Community 
Organization in Rural East Pakistan. Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Michigan State 
University; Cain, M. T. 1978. ‘The Household Life Cycle and Economic Mobility 
in Rural Bangladesh’. Population and Development Review, 4(3): 421–438; Aziz, 
K. M. A. 1979. Kinship in Bangladesh. Dhaka: International Centre for Diarrhoeal 
Disease Research, Bangladesh. 
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Discussions regarding women working ‘outside’ offer a clear 
example of this. Traditionally, the purdah norms governing Bengali 
society have held that women should not ‘go out’ to work. This is part 
of a broader set of norms which prize the associations between women 
and the home on the one hand, and disdain ‘outside’ (manual) work 
even for men on the other. In practice poor women who have no male 
labour on which they can rely have always had to work outside, and this 
has been recognized in society as legitimate (though not desirable). 
Over the past 20 years, however, rates of women’s economic activity 
have rapidly increased, through a combination of the push factors 
of household poverty and rising expectations of consumption on the 
one hand, and the pull factors of mushrooming garment factories, 
micro-credit schemes, and female-coded white collar jobs in health 
and education on the other. 
It is important not to imply that all discussion of women’s outside 
work invoked a transcendental frame of reference. In the majority of 
cases it was described in predominantly pragmatic terms. However, 
some people did draw on religious tradition, text, or local custom, 
in describing their views, and even where these were not explicitly 
mentioned, they were clearly within the rubric that people recognized 
as the legitimate framework of reference for such discussions. 
Although no questions were asked about religion in the 2006 
interviews on marriage and the family, virtually all respondents made 
at least one religious reference. At one level this is simply cultural 
habit. More deeply, however, it suggests a kind of trafﬁc between 
the different levels that Appadurai46 identiﬁes, as he describes how 
people’s aspirations are nested within ‘wider ethical and metaphysical 
ideas which derive from larger cultural norms’. 
The most obviously ‘traditional’ reference that people made in 
discussing women’s work was to the goddess Lakshmi, the Hindu 
goddess of wealth. Reﬂecting the common fund of imagery born of 
many years of co-residence in Bengal, such references were common 
to Muslim as well as Hindu women. Associated with thrift, order, 
wealth and fertility, Lakshmi offers an idealization of wifehood and 
celebration of women’s place in the home as the foundation of 
wellbeing. In all of the references we recorded, she was therefore 
46 Appadurai, A. (2004) ‘The capacity to aspire: Culture and the terms of 
recognition’. In V. Rao and M. Walton (eds), Culture and Public Action. Stanford:  
Stanford University Press, pp. 59–84. 
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invoked by people critical of the current trends. This remark by 
Purnima47 a poor, elderly Hindu woman, is typical: 
Since my younger daughter has gone out to work the Lakshmi of her house 
has also left. 
A more nuanced view links the notion of a divine order with a 
particular spatial, cultural and class location. Thus Sadeka48 staunchly 
defended the view that men should work outside and women maintain 
the house and family, seeing this as what God had determined. She 
continued to explain that while in other countries women might do 
any kind of work this was not the tradition of Bangladesh. However, 
she also went on to qualify this further: educated women like herself, 
she said, could go wherever they liked and mix with ‘outsider’ men. It 
is women in the village who needed to observe the rules more strictly. 
Although a village dweller herself, this clearly indexes ‘village women’ 
as other—simpler, poorer, less capable of good judgement.49 However, 
she also makes clear within this is a pragmatic judgement about 
village society, and women’s vulnerability within it to conservative 
social censure. 
Some people also drew on religion in ways that clearly resonate with 
the ‘cultivation of the pious self’. Here religion does not appear in the 
classic modernist formulation as something set apart, but rather as 
interwoven with and giving meaning to other aspects of daily living. 
This is evident in the following quotation from Ayesha Begum: 
As a wife I do the work in my husband’s household. I cook food, sweep house, 
read the Holy Qur’an and pray, rear hens and ducks and grow vegetables. I 
never join in gossip or tell tales about others. I never act like a spy. I serve my 
husband. All these are my duties as a wife. I follow my husband’s command.50 
Although less common, this self-consciousness about the religious 
grounding of everyday behaviour was also expressed by men. Her 
husband, Abdul Karim put it like this: 
An ideal father has to have a clean personality, he has to stay away from bad 
things [alcohol, women], he has to create an environment free of arguing 
for the children, and he must lead a lifestyle based on Islam. The father has 
47 19a Hp. 
48 014a2. 
49 See also Pigg, S. L. (1992) ‘Inventing Social Categories through Place: Social 
Representations and Development in Nepal’, Comparative Studies in Society and History 
34(3):491–513. 
50 12a Mm.  
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to maintain his purdah by wearing a panjabi [long shirt] and a tupi [Islamic 
cap].51 
This more modernist, self-conscious way of being religious is also 
evident in some people’s frequent references to the coming of 
judgement. That people will face judgement after death for the way 
they have lived is of course an established part of Islamic doctrine. 
However, this has received renewed emphasis in contemporary 
revivalist teaching, making it a much more common ﬁgure within 
everyday speech than was the case a generation ago. This comes 
together with the more traditional sense that the proper ordering 
of relationships relates not only to the here and now, but critically 
to transitions from this life to the next. Gender plays an important 
part in this, as sons are important to carry on the lineage, to celebrate 
the funeral rites and to ensure you pass on in ways that set your soul 
free. Monsur Ali, a poor Muslim man, expresses a conventional view 
in which such ritual concerns are vitally intertwined with the everyday 
of love and material provisioning in the family: 
When I became the father of my ﬁrst child I was most pleased. Then I 
understood why my father loved us so much. Children are most precious to 
people, and when my ﬁrst child was a son, I was so pleased. Everyone has 
hopes for both male and female children, because the feeling for a male and 
a female child is different. As sons will earn money to feed their father, so the 
daughter will love her mother most. If there are no sons the lineage cannot 
be continued, there is no one to bury [me] when I die and no one is there to 
pray for the father. When I die, I won’t be able to pray to Allah, so my sons 
will pray for me.52 
By contrast, Shanti,53 a middle class Hindu woman, presents a 
decidedly modern reﬂection on the brevity of life. After ﬁve years 
of marriage, she said, she was reluctant to have a child. Given that 
‘life lasts two days’ it was enough to lead a happy conjugal life with 
just husband and wife enjoying as a couple all the good things this 
world has to offer. However, later in the interview she discussed the 
social stigma that she experienced being labelled infertile, her grief at 
having a miscarriage and the many treatments she underwent before 
eventually giving birth to her daughter. Of all our respondents, Shanti 
and her husband were the most thoroughly modern and liberal in their 
attitudes. They were far from secular, however, each having a guru 
51 12b Mm. 

52 4b Mp. 

53 01a mH. 
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whose guidance they relied on. As this suggests, revivalist movements 
were evident amongst the Hindu communities, as well as the Muslim. 
The concern with life beyond death is most obviously individual— 
people being held to account for their own actions—but it can also be 
profoundly relational. Hasina Mondol shows this, as she describes how 
the ritual signiﬁcance of sons can also work against you: 
I have a great regret about my children that because of them I will not 
prevail on judgement day. My sons do not pray and that’s why I will not pass 
on the judgement day, because I will have to bear responsibility for them. 
The responsibility for the daughters is over after their marriage. Now their 
husbands are responsible. But the sons are still mine.54 
With such a small sample it is hazardous to make strong claims of 
representative differences. However, higher levels of religious practice 
were evident amongst women than men, and religious education—to 
secure a reliable moral grounding—was particularly valued for women. 
In addition, it was in general older people who were more observant, 
and this was indeed seen as something of an entitlement of old age. 
They explained this not as a mark of their being more traditionally-
minded, but rather to do with their life circumstances. They had more 
time on their hands as the younger generation had taken over the 
major household responsibilities; and they were closer to death, and 
therefore more concerned about the judgement that was to come. 
People also use religious language and imagery as a form of 
emphasis. References to prayer and rituals offer a way to signal 
what really matters—health, having children, a good marriage, the 
children’s future. Petitioning Allah or seeking spiritual help also mark 
deep desire or times of trouble. General statements about the way 
things are offer a means for people to say things about themselves. 
In the following section I explore some dimensions of this, beginning 
with what constitutes a classical indicator of modernity: how people 
make sense of what happens, in terms of their own efforts, fate, or 
providence. 
Fate, God, effort, achievement 
In her study of the different ways that Muslims in Bangladesh follow 
their faith, Banu uses people’s reliance on fate or conﬁdence in their 
54 18a Mm.  
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own agency as an indicator of how modernized or traditional they 
are.55 Although I recognize the logic of this, I found that there was 
a general acceptance, across Hindu and Muslim, rich and poor, men 
and women of the need to make an effort oneself, within the context 
of an overall moral order, in which outcomes were ultimately within 
the scope of God’s ﬁnal authority or gift. The strongest version of this 
was stated by the husband of Shanti, who, as mentioned earlier, while 
modernist in outlook, was also very serious about his religion: 
Your actions determine your fate 
(kormo bhaggo niyontron kore)56 
An older Muslim woman unable to work through ill-health put it 
more bitterly: 
Will I get anything for just calling God’s name?57 
Although our numbers are small, this was one area where a clear 
division could be seen by class. It was predominantly the poor who saw 
what happened as due to fate. The middle class were most likely to 
refer instead to effort. The (much smaller number) who attributed 
outcomes to choice or reasoning were exclusively drawn from the 
middle class or rich. While one might read this in terms of wealthier 
people being more modern, it is perhaps explained more directly by 
differences in wealth having a material effect on people’s ability to 
inﬂuence what happens to them. 
In addition to differences in who says what, there are clear 
differences in the contexts in which people speak. The mix of material 
and spiritual, own action and trust in God as ultimate power is very 
evident in areas of high anxiety. In relation to infertility, for example, 
as elsewhere in the globe, people reported trying an eclectic mix of 
all remedies available: formal and folk medicines, spiritual healers, 
religious offerings, prayer, and rituals.58 After long stories of trial, 
trauma and expense, in the end, people put the outcome down to God. 
This is true whatever the outcome. If they got a child: ‘God gave God’s 
gift’. If not: ‘We await the grace of God’. 
55 See Banu, Islam in Bangladesh, pp. 58–59. As she states (p. 59), in Bangladesh this 
is usually expressed through the concepts of tadbir (planning) and takdir (fate). These 
terms are also discussed by Maloney et al., (1981). Beliefs and Fertility in Bangladesh. 
56 Dhirendronath—01b Hm.  
57 Maleka 011a—Mm. 
58 See, for example, Inhorn, M. C. (2003). Local Babies, Global Science: Gender, Religion, 
and In Vitro Fertilization in Egypt. London: Routledge. 
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A number of things may be going on here. At one level they are 
signalling real limits to their control. With respect to infertility, there 
is of course an established discourse of children being God’s gift. In 
addition, even with the best infertility treatment available, there is 
a randomness to it, and a high rate of failure, which leaves space 
for an extra-scientiﬁc explanation of results. This is all the more 
the case with the level of treatment that the people involved in this 
research could gain access to. Medical treatment more generally in 
Bangladesh is an uncertain affair, again reinforcing the tendency to 
turn to spiritual sources of help in crisis times that are found the world 
over. In both cases, people seeking treatment typically suffer a serious 
deﬁcit of information, and are making decisions on the basis of far from 
perfect knowledge. At another level, however, they are signalling their 
humility and conformity with the moral order. Through statements 
that Allah is holding all, or that they are in God’s hands, people identify 
themselves as satisﬁed, or at least accepting and having made their 
peace with their situation: 
The way God keeps me, it is good.59 
However one might strive to improve one’s situation—and there is 
the clear sense that this is the correct thing to do—ultimately this 
attitude of acceptance of what is given is seen in Bangladesh as a 
critical indicator of maturity and virtue. 
There is an interesting pattern here with references to fate. The 
import of references to God or fate are very similar at this point— 
they signal acceptance of one’s situation. But all the references to fate 
relate to a negative situation, those to God (also) to a positive one. 
Sometimes this shift is even made within the same statement. Latefa60 
thus attributes to fate the fact that she never had a son. She then talks 
about how unhappy she was with her mother-in-law’s regime, and how 
much happier she is now she is in charge of cooking, and can use a 
big pot which enables her to be generous. The positive change she 
attributes to God and says that she is thankful and happy now with 
God’s blessings.61 
59 Kamla—012a Mp.  
60 08a Mr.  
61 I am not sure why this might be—it could be in part that the emotion of 
thankfulness requires a personal object? 
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Stating one’s reliance on God is also a way that people indicate the 
absence of support from anyone else and a general sense of insecurity. 
Widows are particularly vulnerable to this: 
Whenever she feels alone or needs anything she goes to her brother’s or 
sister’s house to talk to them and tell them what she needs. She feels very 
uncertain since her husband died and prays to God for everything to be OK. 
Everything depends on God now.62 
Religious references can thus offer a legitimate means for a lament 
or even complaint, in a discursive context which discourages drawing 
direct attention to oneself and valorizes acceptance and adjustment.63 
This avoidance of talking directly about oneself is evident in many 
of the ways people talk in Bangladesh. Engaging the listener with 
rhetorical questions is one example by which speakers render ‘common 
knowledge’ what they are wanting to say. Another is to make a general 
or even proverbial comment ‘a woman’s life!’ in a way that refers to 
but does not state explicitly one’s own situation. Veena Das describes 
for Punjab how this may be rendered even more indirect by being 
apparently addressed to no one, but deliberately set up so that it 
may be ‘overheard’.64 Indeed, the structure of Bengali itself favours 
indirect constructions of speech, with the passive voice used frequently 
where an active construction would be used in English.65 While indirect 
speech is not limited to women, this discursive avoidance of claiming 
direct attention is clearly highly gendered. The added value of religious 
references is clear—one shields oneself with pious conformity at the 
same time as one exposes oneself in complaint. 
Politics of religion 
The play between different understandings of religion is very evident 
in the moves of reformist Islam to use the family to capture and re­
shape the social or political order. Here I consider two main forms of 
62 Anjumon Bewa—015a Mp.  
63 Wilce, J. M. Jr (1998). ‘The pragmatics of “madness”: performance analysis of a 
Bangladeshi woman’s “aberrant” lament’. Culture, Medicine and Psychiatry 22:1–54. 
64 Das, Veena (2000). ‘The act of witnessing: violence, poisonous knowledge, and 
subjectivity’, pp. 205–241, especially p. 220, in  Violence and Subjectivity (eds) V. Das, A.  
Kleinman, M. Ramphele, and P. Reynolds. Berkeley/Oxford: University of California 
Press. 
65 Thus love ‘strikes’ one (maya lage) and sickness ‘happens’ to one (osukh hoyecche). 
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reformist Islam in Bangladesh: the political party, Jamaat-e-Islami,66 
and the pietist movement, the Tablighi Jamaat.67 The data so far 
have been presented in quite a generalized way, individual statements 
of many different individuals drawn together to present a composite 
image of continuities and change. This section concentrates instead 
on one individual, Amma Huzur,68 a middle aged, lower middle class 
rural woman, who is closely associated with the Tablighi Jamaat. 
Concentrating the focus in this way allows us to explore in a little 
more depth both what she says about gender and Islam and how this 
translates into practical terms in her life. I have chosen to focus on 
her speciﬁcally because of all our respondents, it was she who came 
closest to Mahmood’s notion of someone dedicated to cultivating the 
‘pious self’, and thus at the heart of the theoretical paradox which this 
paper seeks to address. 
Just as the ﬁgure of Lakshmi places women at the heart of the family 
and the home, so the Tabligh and the Jamaat share a view that women’s 
religiosity is critical to the spiritual wellbeing of the family. Despite 
a considerable degree of shared theology, however, their styles and 
approaches are very different, such that there is considerable conﬂict 
between them. In simple terms, the Tabligh feel the Jamaat have 
sold out religion to politics; and the Jamaat feel the Tabligh are self-
centred, self-indulgent, unwilling to take on the social responsibility 
of ordering society. Whilst this opposition between them is keenly felt 
there is, nonetheless, recognition that ultimately their efforts may pull 
in the same direction. 
This general picture is reﬂected in the local context of our research. 
Amma Huzur’s hostility to the Jamaat-e-Islami is keen, not least 
because she has been personally attacked by them for moving around 
66 The Jamaat-e-Islami is the main Islamist political party in Bangladesh. Out of 
favour after liberation for having supported Pakistan, the Jamaat-e-Islami party re­
entered politics as an active and visible participant in 1990, forming a ruling coalition 
with the Bangladesh Nationalist Party after the 1991 election. 
67 The Tablighi Jamaat is a worldwide pietist movement of religious revival, 
typically stated to have begun in 1927. At its core is the call to revival of the 
inner life and personal puriﬁcation, which is often delivered through missionary tours 
undertaken by its members. For more information see Metcalf, B. (1998). ‘Islam and 
women. The case of the tablighi Jamaat’, in Appropriating Gender: Women’s Agency, the 
State and Politicized Religion in South Asia. (Zones of Religion) (eds) Amrita Basu and 
Patricia Jeffrey. London: Routledge; and Metcalf, B. (2003). ‘Travellers’ Tales in the 
Tablighi Jamaat’. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol.  588, 
Islam: Enduring Myths and Changing Realities (July), pp. 136–148. 
68 ‘Amma Huzur’ is an honoriﬁc title. The quotes given here are drawn from two 
extended interviews which took place in her home. 50a Mm.  
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too freely, and because they have frequently tried to colonize her work 
for more directly political ends. Despite this, she grudgingly admits 
that ‘both of us are working on the same road’: 
The Jamaat-i-Islami people are trying to establish law of Quran as state law. 
They want to see honest people as social leader. We do not have any argument 
with that vision. 
A Jamaati activist concurred with this. Having expressed his distaste 
for the Tabligh, and the major criticisms he has of them, he went on 
to say: 
But in other ways, it helps us a lot for the national election. They are trying 
to spread Islamic values in every ladder of the society and not participating in 
the national politics. When the election time comes, we will take the beneﬁt 
of their activity. Village people or town people if they become more and more 
pious, it is better for Islam. People will think about us before they give their 
votes. 
The Ja’amat do not, however, rely solely on the Tabligh to lay their 
foundations in society, they also work directly to mobilize an Islamist 
community. Maimuna Huq describes one instance of this: reading 
sessions of the Jamaat afﬁliated female students’ organization, the 
Bangladesh Islamic Chattri Sangstha which offer: 
a practice-oriented Islam—where deliberation amid participants, facilitated 
by the wide circulation of sermons on tape cassette and unfolding against a 
background of shared moral sensibilities, is integral to the cultivation of an 
everyday, embodied subjection to orthodox Islamic norms.69 
This would seem an almost textbook example of what Foucault or 
Rose describe, a modernist, even liberational idiom of learning and 
open discussion, which enables the enrolment of the students within 
particular structures of power. 
As Foucault himself would caution, however, it is a mistake to 
assume that power runs only one way. Sayyid Abul A’la Maududi 
(1903–1979), the founder of Jamaat-i-Islam, propounded a heavily 
patriarchal reading of the moral order, in which women should remain 
strictly within the home and at all times under male authority. 
Practical politics have made this a difﬁcult line to hold. Jamaat was 
the ﬁrst organization to grant membership to women as individuals 
69 Huq, Maimuna. (2008). ‘Reading the Qur’an in Bangladesh: The Politics of 
“Belief” Among Islamist Women’. Modern Asian Studies 42(2–3): 457–488, March,  
p. 46. 
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on the basis of the Qur’an and Hadith, obliging them to preach its 
ideology to their families and even disobey their male guardians if 
the men commanded them to sin against Allah.70 From a position of 
limiting women’s political participation to the right to vote, Maududi 
even supported a female candidate71 in Pakistan’s January 1965 
presidential elections as the lesser evil compared with Ayub Khan’s 
martial law regime.72 This pre-ﬁgures the Bangladeshi Jamaat’s 
participation in the Bangladesh National Party government headed 
by Begum Zia—again, a woman leader there by virtue of her dynastic 
credentials. Shehabuddin notes that in Bangladesh the Jamaat’s 
interest in women voters means that: 
Saidi [a popular Jamaat speaker] goes to great lengths to reassure women 
that Islam is supportive of their rights, that Islam has made women winners, 
not losers.73 
In common with the Islamic piety movement more broadly, Amma 
Huzur’s speech is quite different from that of most other respondents, 
involving frequent use of speciﬁcally Islamic (Arabic) terms in place 
of alternative Bengali ones.74 She is steeped in Islamic texts, having 
learnt several religious instruction manuals off by heart, and her 
discourse is suffused both with explicit religious references and with 
the mission she sees ‘to make the disorderly society ordered’. Amma 
Huzur holds weekly meetings with village women to ‘remind them 
about religion’ and organizes larger meetings on a monthly and annual 
basis. She also travels to lead meetings in other villages when invited 
to do so. She has established a ‘talim’ house in the village, where women 
can meet regularly for prayer and religious instruction. Gender and 
family relations constitute a recurring theme in her preaching and 
instruction: 
Generally, village women do not follow the rule of Islam in their lives. They 
have become the member of the Union Parishad [local government]. They are 
70 Ahmad, I. (2008). ‘Cracks in the “Mightiest Fortress”: Jamaat-e-Islami’s 
Changing Discourse on Women’. Modern Asian Studies, Volume 42, Special Double 
Issue 2–3, March  2008, pp. 549–575. 
71 The candidate was Fatimah Jinnah, sister of Muhammed Ali Jinnah, the most 
prominent leader of the movement for Pakistan. 
72 Shehabuddin, E. (2008). ‘Jamaat-i-Islami in Bangladesh: Women, Democracy 
and the Transformation of Islamist Politics’. Modern Asian Studies 42(2–3):577–603, 
March. 
73 Ibid. pp. 600–601. 
74 See also Haniffa  (2008). ‘Piety as Politics’. 
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going to the district court house alone. They do not think why unhappiness has 
occurred in the world. They do not know the right way to live. They do not bend 
their heads in front of their husbands. They do not keep purdah. In the past 
amongst Muslims, husband feared the wife and the wife feared the husband. 
They had mutual respect for each other. Nowadays, wives are quarrelling 
with their husbands face to face. Doing such deeds is strictly forbidden in 
Islam. Through doing these things wives are ruining their akherat (life after 
death) entirely. 
On ﬁrst impressions, her line is conventional and strongly 
patriarchal. Women are offending by engaging in politics and the law, 
and in doing so unaccompanied, and in not observing purdah. In the 
later part, however, it is interesting how she emphasizes disharmony 
and loss of respect, rather than an offence against gender hierarchy. 
What is lost is married couples’ mutual fear and respect and the ability 
to handle differences courteously. For Amma Huzur, the way to restore 
the moral order is to re-kindle piety and orthodox religious practice. 
Women hold the key to this: 
If we can make a mother pious then she will be able to raise her children 
accordingly. A mother is the centre of a family and the ﬁrst teacher of the 
children. 
Even if a husband is bad, through her piety she may be able to 
reform him, and bring him back to Islam. She also suggests that piety 
will bring husband and wife closer together: 
A husband cannot beat a pious wife so easily. . .. When a wife starts praying 
namaz, it softens her husband’s mind towards her. 
There is of course nothing new in placing the burden for either 
family virtue or family piety on women. Looking more deeply into 
her practice, however, Amma Huzur’s overall proﬁle is rather more 
ambiguous than her words suggest. In the face of marital unhappiness, 
Amma Huzur has found in holding talim meetings not only personal 
fulﬁlment, but also a legitimate way to spend time away from home. 
While not being able to effect complete reform, she has brought her 
husband to the Tabligh and managed to curb some of the worst 
excesses of lasciviousness, rudeness and violence. After a previous 
broken marriage Islam has offered a means of social rehabilitation. 
Her piety, coupled with her hard work in improving the economic 
situation of the family, has earned her the reputation of a good wife 
and mother. The meetings seem also at times to constitute a site of 
resistance, where women gather to share information that their men 
would rather it be kept at home, and even the basis for collective 
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action to defend a member’s interests. While Amma Huzur positions 
herself as the voice of tradition, therefore, she seems in many ways to 
be a thoroughly modern ﬁgure, autonomous and entrepreneurial, self-
cultivating in identity, and evangelical in her project to rectify the self. 
Conclusion 
The founding fathers of social science expected that as societies 
became more modern, religion would decline. In fact, in Bangladesh 
as elsewhere, substantial economic, social and political change has 
been accompanied by religion becoming more, rather than less, 
emphasized. This paper focuses on discussions of gender and the family 
in Bangladesh to explore this apparent paradox. 
Doing research on any subject involves the danger of distortion, 
and this is certainly the case with religion. The ﬁrst danger is of 
exaggerating its signiﬁcance. While for some amongst our respondents 
religion provided a habitual preoccupation, for most, proper religious 
observance was something they said they wanted but failed to 
achieve, usually because they had too much work to get on with. 
The noise surrounding symbolic oppositions between ‘religion’ and 
‘development’ belie their pragmatic accommodation in everyday life. 
In addition, as described above, by no means all use of religious 
language says something speciﬁcally ‘religious’. People use religious 
references to emphasize what is important to them; to position 
themselves as thankful, or at least in a state of (socially sanctioned) 
adjustment to or acceptance of the way things are; or to signal the 
limits of their own power, sometimes indicating humility, but at other 
times hopelessness, alienation or complaint. Finally, what appears to 
be religious may simply reﬂect a certain cultural style. Thus Islamic 
dress may be simply fashion, going on pilgrimage simply an outing 
with friends.75 
The second issue is what is understood by religion. Even taking 
religion as a subject in itself carries the danger of imagining it 
in a distinctly modern way as a ‘set apart’ arena of practices and 
beliefs. This paper argues that, on the contrary, the predominant 
understanding of religion in Bangladesh is as part of the taken-
for-granted moral order. This co-exists with a more modern way of 
75 Farzana Haniffa, (2009), pers. comm. 
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viewing religion, as requiring reﬂective cultivation. The size of our 
sample cautions against generalization, but more than gender, age, 
location, or religion, it seemed to be class and education that made 
a difference to the way people talked about religion, with educated 
middle income or wealthy people much more likely than the poor to 
attribute outcomes to their own agency, and to talk about religion 
in self-conscious, ‘modern’, terms. It is important, however, not to 
jump too quickly into conﬁrming conventional assumptions about the 
‘backward’ poor and modernizing elites. While some people more 
often identify religion as a settled, background factor within the 
broader moral order, and others more often as a self-conscious set 
of precepts, many individuals and even statements combine aspects 
of both. In addition, even the more self-conscious statements did 
not identify religion as something private or removed, but a self-
conscious set of rules for life, intimately entwined with everyday 
conduct and relationships. While this might suggest simply a society 
in transition, I suspect it indicates not the gradual replacement of 
religion as embedded in the moral order to a more speciﬁc set of 
precepts, but rather continued trafﬁc between everyday behaviour and 
the negotiation of cultural and religious norms. Linear narratives of 
modernity notwithstanding, such mixtures and unstable settlements 
between ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ elements may be more the norm 
than the exception. Thus in her discussion of race and modernity, Ann 
Laura Stoler comments that what is interesting: 
is not so much modern racism’s break with earlier forms, but rather the 
discursive bricolage whereby an older discourse of race is ‘recovered’, modiﬁed, 
‘encased’, and ‘encrusted’ in new forms.76 
The notion of ‘discursive bricolage’ seems to ﬁt well the mix of 
traditional and modern, Hindu and Muslim, folk Bengali and textual 
religion which make up the set of religious resources on which people 
draw to negotiate the challenges of changing gender and generational 
relations in contemporary Bangladesh. The politics of how people 
use these resources are also indeterminate. ‘New’, more textual 
approaches may at times be used to reinforce custom, and at other 
times to question it. Thus, while both Hindus and Muslims re-iterated 
the common saying that ‘heaven lies under the feet of the husband’, 
some remarked that the Islamic verse in fact states that ‘heaven 
76 Stoler, A. L. (1996). Race and the Education of Desire: Foucault’s History of Sexuality 
and the Colonial Order of Things. Durham/London: Duke University Press, p. 61. 
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lies under the feet of the mother’.77 On the one hand more liberal 
people used religious text to argue against the exclusion of girls from 
education or employment. On the other hand it was used to argue 
for stricter patriarchal controls, or to denounce some customs long 
established in Islam as locally practised, causing trauma and division 
amongst Muslims in the name of new claims to orthodoxy, and indeed 
counterclaims, from those who interpreted the text differently.78 
The increasing incorporation of Bangladesh within globalized 
capitalism has generated signiﬁcant changes in the organization of 
economy and society, bringing major challenges to the established 
moral order and how it codiﬁes proper relationships by gender and 
generation. This simultaneously reshapes the character of religion 
and sparks a much broader process of moral questioning, in which 
people turn to religion—amongst other resources—for guidance. 
While narratives of modernity tend to read history in a linear way, 
therefore, there is much to be said for viewing it more cyclically. 
Although the form that each has taken is clearly distinct, this would 
see the current ‘resurgence’ of religion in Bangladesh in the context 
of historical precedents such as the Brahmo Samaj Hindu reform 
movement which arose in response to the accelerated economic, social 
and political change that was colonial Bengal. This is supported by the 
Osellas’ argument that Islamic revivalist movements in South Asia are 
relatively common, and are generated through local dynamics, even 
if they articulate with global currents for reform.79 Further aﬁeld, 
analogies might be seen in the rise of Methodism and evangelicalism 
in industrializing Britain80 or Hobsbawm and Ranger’s arguments that 
times of rapid change call out ‘the invention of tradition’ to provide a 
sense of reassurance and stability.81 Whilst this paper has emphasized 
talk and culture, this is clearly only a partial perspective on a much 
larger whole in which political economy plays the major role. 
77 This is a frequently quoted hadith, one of the sayings attributed to the Prophet 
Muhammad. 
78 A speciﬁc custom mentioned, for example, was the making of sweets and bread 
on the night of Shab-e-bharat (night of freedom), which had been declared haram 
(forbidden) by followers of the neo-Orthodox Mohammedi sect. 
79 Osella, Filippo and Caroline. (2008). ‘Islamism and social reform in Kerala, 
South India’. Modern Asian Studies. 42(2–3): 259–281, March.  
80 See e.g. E. P. Thompson. (1963). The Making of the English Working Class. 
Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
81 Hobsbawm, E. and Ranger, T. (1983). The Invention of Tradition. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
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There is one further dynamic which may contribute to the re­
emphasis on religion in the development of modernity. As noted 
above, classical studies of religion and modernity see structural 
changes in the economy and society as bringing with them a dynamic 
towards secularization, which displaces religious institutions from the 
undisputed centre of social and political organization. While this by 
no means removes religion from the public sphere, it does re-deﬁne 
its sphere of inﬂuence, to identify it as primarily a personal matter, 
associated with life-cycle events and the cognitive/affective area of 
beliefs, emotions and values. So far, so familiar. What is less commonly 
recognized, however, is that just as modernity reassigns religion to the 
personal sphere, so it also constitutes ‘the personal’ as a primary arena 
of governance, discipline, and satisfaction. The shift in structures of 
family life, and the ways people are investing different meaning in 
their relationships, is another dimension of this. What appears from 
one point of view to be the marginalization of religion, thus brings with it 
simultaneously a re-discovery of and re-emphasis upon it, along with other 
aspects of the personal and the self. From being a taken-for-granted 
part of the way things are, religion thus becomes a focus in itself, 
something that must be known, studied, disputed, cultivated and—for 
some at least—struggled for politically. 
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